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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

T

his publication details the foundational
logic supporting a call to action, related
to a broad-based effort to articulate and
institutionalize a National Veterans Strategy.
We argue that coordinated, “whole-ofgovernment” action toward this end is essential
to meet the nation’s most important economic,
social, and security obligations. Furthermore, we
contend that the second Obama administration,
working in close collaboration with executive
agencies, Congress, and the private sector, is
well-positioned to act on what we perceive to
be a historic opportunity – capitalizing on both
the foundations of veteran-focused policy and
progress enacted over the past decade and the
overwhelming public support for returning veterans
and military families – to craft and institutionalize a
National Veterans Strategy.
Our purpose is to provide a researched
and logically-developed case for action that is
grounded in this nation’s social and cultural
traditions and attuned to the practical realities of
our contemporary economic and political climate.
Given this purpose, it is important to highlight what
this publication is not. It is not our intent to:
1) Define what a National Veterans Strategy
should espouse, with regard to issue-specific
policy or practice; or
2) Identify or prioritize the many issue-based
concerns that might inform or drive the process
toward a National Veterans Strategy.
Instead, we suggest that these important
issues represent outcomes resulting from a
thoughtful and consensus-building strategy
planning process. We do, however, suggest the
basis for how such a strategy planning process
might proceed.

WHY NOW?
Why is now the time to act on a National Veterans
Strategy?
1) The federal government’s tenuous, long-term
fiscal trajectory is forcing policymakers to
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confront difficult choices related to resource
allocation, which may possibly affect funding for
benefits and services impacting veterans and
their families. A National Veterans Strategy will
enable focused, efficient and principled fiscal
decision-making.
2) The current institutional framework governing
the scope of challenges affecting veterans and
their families remains far too disparate, reactive,
and administratively marginalized, despite
the best intentions of many in the public and
private sectors. A National Veterans Strategy
is likely to support improved interagency and
public-private coordination, in turn supporting
strategic choices that position inherently limited
resources in their first, best use.
3) It is reasonable and prudent to believe that,
despite considerable goodwill toward veterans
and military families that exists today, veteranfocused concerns may fade from public
consciousness after 2014 as the nation moves
past thirteen years of sustained war. Action now
toward crafting a National Veterans Strategy
is conducive to institutionalizing systems
and practices that may sustain citizen- and
government-wide investment in the nation’s
veterans and military families into the future.
4) Research and data-driven scholarship that
informs veterans’ policy is central to principled
policy formulation, implementation and
evaluation. A National Veterans Strategy is best
positioned to cultivate, unite and organize an
interdisciplinary field of veteran policy studies
that may serve to balance economically rational
decision-making with principled policymaking in
the face of an increasingly constrained resource
environment.
5) Assuming that the all-volunteer force (AVF) will
endure, a strong social and cultural connection
between those who volunteer for service and
those who do not is necessary to engender
broad societal support for the post-service
challenges impacting veterans and their
families. A National Veterans Strategy that

facilitates and institutionalizes a three-way
dialogue between the public, the military, and
the government reinforces stable civil-military
relations through increased public engagement
in veteran and military affairs.
6) The future of the AVF is dependent upon the
military’s ability to continuously attract the
nation’s most skilled, talented and serviceminded individuals. A National Veterans
Strategy is symbolic, but more importantly
instrumental, in affirming America’s enduring
commitment to both the AVF model and those
who volunteer to serve (today and in the future).

A NATIONAL VETERANS STRATEGY:
THE FOUNDATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS
The economic, social and security foundations of a
National Veterans Strategy should be grounded in a
set of closely-held assumptions and attitudes about
American citizenship, fairness, military service and
civil-military relations. While not all-inclusive, the
foundational assumptions informing a National
Veterans Strategy include:
1) The social contract between American society
and its veterans is inviolate, enduring and must
be continuously upheld.
2) The social contract between American society
and its veterans, by extension, confers a
societal obligation to the families of those who
serve.
3) While veterans are honored in American
society today, this social distinction is neither a
historical constant, nor is it assured for future
generations.
4) The existing institutional arrangement governing
veterans’ policy is not adequately informed
or coordinated by a coherent “whole-ofgovernment” policy or optimally integrated with
private-sector efforts.
5) Changes to the rights, benefits and services
that represent societal means of satisfying the
social contract between the nation and those
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who serve, should be principled, rational and
coordinated.
6) A positive social perception of military service
supports the AVF imperative of recruiting a highquality and socio-economically representative
force.
7) Efforts to support the post-service welfare of
those who volunteer for service positively serves
the AVF imperative of recruiting a high-quality
and socio-economically representative force.
In this report we deconstruct these
assumptions to illustrate their economic, social and
national security implications and suggest how and
why these assumptions inform the set of “guiding
questions” appropriate to serve as a framework for
a National Veterans Strategy planning process.

BUILDING CONSENSUS AND
PROCESS: GUIDING QUESTIONS
How would consensus around a National Veterans
Strategy process proceed? We provide a set
of guiding questions to: 1) constructively frame
an inclusive dialogue on veterans’ issues and
policy goals; and 2) serve as an initial framework
from which to craft a strategic planning process,
including the rules, incentives, oversight
mechanisms, and resource coordination aimed at
efficient and effective policy implementation. At the
highest level, these questions include:
1) Who should be involved in a strategic
conversation and planning process impacting
veterans’ policy?
2) Why do we, as Americans, care for our veterans
and their families?
3) Who is an American veteran?
4) What recognition, benefits or services
ought the nation provide its veterans and their
families?
5) What can the nation reasonably afford to
provide its veterans, today and in the future?

SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS
We maintain that the second Obama
administration, working in close partnership with
Congress and the private sector, is well-positioned
to act on a historic opportunity to craft and
institutionalize a National Veterans Strategy.
Given the overwhelming public support for
veterans and military families, combined with
progress and momentum resulting from recent
policy and practice successes, now is the time to
act. We offer six initial recommendations as a path
toward realizing the inherent potential of a National
Veterans Strategy:
1) Create a presidentially directed Veterans’ Public
Engagement and Collaborative Governance
Commission, responsible for engaging a broad
base of stakeholders in a dialogue on veterans’
issues.
2) Establish a single point of authority (directive
and budgetary), responsible for coordinating and
directing the execution of a National Veterans
Strategy.
3) Establish an Interagency Policy Committee on
Veterans, responsible for crafting a National
Veterans Strategy.
4) Establish a standing National Veterans Advisory
Board, responsible for providing strategic advice
and counsel to the president, Congress and
implementing agencies related to veteran’s
policy.
5) Create and institutionalize a forward-looking,
periodic review process designed to assess
evolving veterans’ policy and programs across
the federal government.

“The repercussions of war
persist for years and decades
after the last shot is fired,
but we seldom consider the
inevitable costs, the economic
consequences, and the impact
on quality of life for those who
fought and their families.
As a war-weary America
returns from 13 years of
exhausting conflict in Iraq and
Afghanistan, we must put in a
place a long-term strategy for
taking care of the wounded,
reconstructing lives and
repaying war debts.”
— 		 Professor Linda J. Bilmes
		 Harvard University
		 Co-author of The Three Trillion
Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq
Conflict

6) Create a voluntary coalition of private sector
stakeholders, responsible for cultivating and
formalizing a model of collaborative engagement
that best aligns the resources of government,
corporate, foundation and community partners
in support of veterans and their families.

6) How (and by who) should these benefits
and services be delivered?
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BUILDING CONSENSUS & PROCESS: GUIDING QUESTIONS

Who should be involved in a strategic conversation
and planning process impacting veterans’ policy?
Why do we, as Americans, care for our veterans and their families?

T

Who is an American veteran?

he purpose of this publication is to develop the

What recognition, benefits or services ought the
nation provide its veterans and their families?

case and foundational logic to support action
toward crafting a National Veterans Strategy. The

What can the nation reasonably afford to provide
its veterans, today and in the future?

central premise and finding of this publication is that

How (and by who) should these benefits and
services be delivered?

developing, articulating, and institutionalizing a National
Veterans Strategy is necessary to serve important social,

BUILDING A PROCESS WILL

economic and security objectives, and is also consistent
with the inherent social contract that defines the

1 Constructively frame an inclusive dialogue on veterans’ issues and policy goals

relationship between the nation and its veterans.

2 the rules, incentives, oversight mechanisms, and resource coordination aimed at

Serve as an initial framework from which to craft a strategic planning process, including
efficient and effective policy implementation
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RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ADMINISTRATION
2

3

4

5

Establish a single point
of authority (directive and
budgetary), responsible
for coordinating and
directing the execution
of a National Veterans
Strategy.

Establish an Interagency
Policy Committee on
Veterans, responsible
for crafting a National
Veterans Strategy.

Establish a standing
National Veterans
Advisory Board,
responsible for providing
strategic advice
and counsel to the
president, Congress and
implementing agencies
related to veteran’s policy.

Create and institutionalize
a forward-looking,
periodic review process
designed to assess
evolving veterans’ policy
and programs across the
federal government.

1

6

Create a presidentially
directed Veterans’
Public Engagement and
Collaborative Governance
Commission, responsible
for engaging a broad
base of stakeholders in
a dialogue on veterans’
issues.

Create a voluntary
coalition of private sector
stakeholders, responsible
for cultivating and
formalizing a model of
collaborative engagement
that best aligns the
resources of government,
corporate, foundation and
community partners.
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A

s the end of America’s longest wartime
chapter nears, questions about how
the nation will support and empower
its newest generation of military veterans have
ascended in the national political discourse.
Academics, policy analysts, the media and
veterans groups continue to highlight the need
for collaborative and coordinated efforts to
address the challenges, concerns, opportunities
and innovations impacting the post-service life
course of those who have shouldered the burden
of the nation’s wars. Issues such as homelessness, suicide, mental health, unemployment,
education and comprehensive access to benefits
and healthcare sit atop this collective priority list
(Berglass, 2010, 2012; Berglass & Harrell, 2012;
Carter, 2012; Tanielian & Jaycox, 2008).
The Obama administration has made praiseworthy efforts to coordinate government-wide
action focused on the issues impacting veterans
and their families. Initiatives such as Joining
Forces have heightened public awareness of the
challenges facing many veterans and military
families and have provided an opportunity for
engaged citizens to act in response to those
challenges (The White House, 2011). The
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), Department
of Defense (DoD), Department of Labor (DOL),
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the
Small Business Administration (SBA), and other
federal agencies have made meaningful strides
toward transforming policies, practices and
service delivery systems to better address the
contemporary realities associated with supporting the post-service life course of the nation’s
veterans (HCVA, 2012; HUD, 2012; The White
House, 2012).1 Further, Congress has demonstrated a pattern of largely bipartisan support
and leadership focused on improving the situation of the nation’s veterans and families. Select
examples of important legislative actions include
the Veterans Opportunity to Work (VOW) to Hire

“As the end of the longest war in our nation’s history draws near, a
National Veterans Strategy would serve as an enduring thank you
on behalf of a grateful nation as our generation of veterans return
home to their families.”
— SMA Ken Preston (Ret.), 13th Sergeant Major of the Army

“Having a coherent articulation of the national responsibility for
veterans’ support will be critical in the time ahead. I applaud this
effort, concur that it is a worthy objective, and do not understate
the magnitude of the challenge.”
— Hon. Sean O’Keefe, Chairman and CEO, EADS North America, 10th NASA Administrator,
69th Secretary of the Navy

Heroes Act, the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act and the Honoring America’s
Veterans & Caring for Camp Lejeune Families Act
of 2012.
However, following more than 12 years of
sustained war – and in light of current and
planned reductions in the size of the U.S. military

The second Obama administration,
working in close collaboration with
executive agencies, Congress, and the
private sector, is well-positioned to act
on a historic opportunity.”
– it remains the opinion of many leading voices
in government, academia and the veterans
community that the economic, social and governance challenges associated with effectively
meeting our national obligation to our veterans
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and their families will present a formidable
challenge in the years and decades ahead
(Berglass, 2010; Carter, 2013; Chandra et al.,
2008; Wright, 2012a, 2012b). Importantly, the
consequences associated with failing in our collective obligation to the nation’s veterans are
high; such a failure will have adverse implications for the sustainability of an AVF2 and thus
our national security (Pincus, 2013). Additionally, failing to effectively, efficiently and meaningfully empower those who have shouldered the
burden of the nation’s wars may precipitate
social and economic challenges capable of
overwhelming these supportive services for
decades.
Thus, we contend that the second Obama
administration, working in close collaboration
with executive agencies, Congress, and the
private sector, is well-positioned to act on a
historic opportunity — capitalizing on both the
foundations of policy and progress enacted
over the past decade and the overwhelming
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2) Propose and formalize mechanisms to
embed those assumptions into a “wholeof-government” strategic policy, practice
and infrastructure (where appropriate) that
engages and empowers the private sector,
veteran service organizations and local
communities; and
3) Develop and implement a forwardlooking strategic planning process that
informs veterans’ policy in a way that is
efficient, effective and consistent with the
assumptions that underlie the nation’s
obligation to all those who have served.

A NATIONAL VETERANS STRATEGY
SUPPORTS THREE PRIMARY
OBJECTIVES
First, a National Veterans Strategy represents a
mechanism to harnesses citizen- and government-wide investment and engagement in the
concerns of the nation’s veterans and military
families. By design, the inclusion of a broad and
formalized public dialogue on veteran issues –
a necessary condition of a National Veterans
Strategy – is an important and distinguishing
feature from other strategic planning processes,
which are largely exercises internal to the federal
government. Emphasizing a national dialogue
in this process publically renews the implicit
social contract between American society and its
veterans and military families. Moreover, robust
connections between the American people, the
military (including veterans and their families)
and the government – the “paradoxical trinity”
(Clausewitz, 2006, pp. 30-31) – are important
factors to ensuring healthy civil-military relations
and a well-grounded grand strategy. Dialogue on
these matters will remain critical as we enter an
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1) Initiate dialogue and build toward
broad consensus related to the foundational
assumptions that define our collective
obligation (today and in the future) to those
who volunteer for military service;
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era marked by global uncertainty and diminishing societal ties to the armed forces.
Second, a National Veterans Strategy is
positioned to foster sound, 21st century public

Military service will be socially
regarded and institutionally supported
– for years and decades to come –
as our nation’s highest calling and
ultimate expression of citizenship.”
governance. Veterans’ policy is rapidly transforming into a “wicked problem” due to the
broad scope and complexity of issues it aims to
address. A National Veterans Strategy will likely
better align the efforts and resources of myriad
governmental, non-governmental and private
stakeholders working in this policy space toward
a common set of policy goals. Moreover, it will
more fully institutionalize and strengthen administrative systems, interagency and public-private
coordination and planning processes resulting in
better-informed policy and program evaluation.
Further, effective and efficient allocation of the
tools, resources, responsibilities and authority
to both inform and implement veterans’ policy
and programs will promote more timely, efficient
and high-quality outcomes for veterans and their
families.
Finally, a National Veterans Strategy is
fundamental to a sustainable national defense,
namely the recruitment and preservation of a

robust, all-volunteer military force. The all-volunteer military must continually attract the interest
of diverse and talented Americans — representative of the diversity inherent in American
society — to succeed in its security mission (DOD,
2012).3 The efficacy of programs and supports
related to the transition of service members to civilian life, and how those programs are perceived
by future volunteers, represents an essential motivation for future military service. Establishing a
national strategic planning process for veterans’
issues pays tribute to those who have served
and concomitantly signals to future generations
that military service will be socially regarded and
institutionally supported – for years and decades
to come – as our nation’s highest calling and
ultimate expression of citizenship.
Given the potential advantages highlighted
above, this report details the foundational logic
supporting action toward articulating and institutionalizing a National Veterans Strategy. To that
end, it is important at this point to highlight what
this publication is not. It is not our purpose to:
1) Define what a National Veterans Strategy ‘is’
or should espouse with regard to policy or
practice, or
2) Identify or prioritize the issue-based concerns
that will presumably make up the practice
focus of a National Veterans Strategy.
We contend that these important (and likely
contentious) issues represent outcomes that will
result from the process of carefully crafting and
institutionalizing a National Veterans Strategy.
Instead, our purpose is to offer a researched and
logically developed “case for acting” on the imperative to develop a National Veterans Strategy
– a strategy that is situated in both this nation’s
social and cultural traditions and in the practical
realities inherent in a contemporary social and
economic environment.
In what follows, we begin by addressing
the question: Why is now the time to act on a
National Veterans Strategy? Building on what we
perceive as an urgency for action, we then deconstruct the moral, social, economic, and security-based assumptions that should both motivate
and inform the foundation of a National Veterans
Strategy by highlighting the benefits conferred
to veterans, government and other stakeholders
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that would likely result from this effort. We then
offer a series of guiding questions that, based
on our research, represent central issues to be
addressed in the context of crafting a National
Veterans Strategy. Finally, we conclude with a
series of summary recommendations suggestive
of a pathway to act on the insights suggested by
this report.

WHY NOW?
Many would ask: In light of the fact that the
Obama administration and Congress jointly face
a number of disparate and pressing economic,
social, and national security challenges, why
is now the time to act on a National Veterans
Strategy?
First, the federal government’s uncertain fiscal
trajectory is forcing policymakers to confront difficult choices related to funding priorities, possibly
including veterans’ benefits and services (GAO,
2012a). Developing, articulating and institutionalizing a National Veterans Strategy may enable
more focused and efficient use of increasingly
constrained resources.
Consider that in 2013 the U.S. will direct
an estimated $140.3 billion to veteran-related
programs and services (VA, 2012a). According
to the Congressional Research Service (Scott,
2012), the VA budget authority last year ($130B)
was already more than double FY2000 levels
($58.5B) and 14 times FY1940 levels ($8.8B)
in constant FY11 dollars. These increases are
largely driven by rising healthcare costs for an
aging veteran population; an increasing number
of beneficiaries eligible to receive veterans
disability benefits (and the complexity of those
claims); and increases in the scope of income
security, housing aid and education and training
programs such as the Post 9/11 GI Bill. It is
important to highlight that unplanned mandates
have contributed significantly to increases in
veterans-related spending and to the complexity
and breath of services and benefits administered by the VA.
Looking ahead, veterans’ programs and
benefits in the coming years will experience
increased pressure from the nearly one million
additional service members who are projected to
leave the military by 2016 — adding to the over
two million post-9/11 veterans that have already

transitioned to civilian life.
From FY09 to FY11, the VA experienced a
29% rise in disability claims and has struggled
keeping pace with this rise (GAO, 2012c). More-

According to the Congressional
Research Service (Scott, 2012), the
VA budget authority last year ($130B)
was already more than double
FY2000 levels ($58.5B) and 14 times
FY1940 levels ($8.8B) in constant
FY11 dollars.”
over, post-9/11 veterans are filing for disability
benefits at a higher rate than any generation
before them (VA, 2012b, Marchione, 2012). The
severity and complexity of many of the health
and wellness challenges impacting the contemporary generation of veterans requires ongoing
and increasingly advanced protocols of care and
rehabilitative technologies. With this increased
demand for veterans’ benefits and services, the
budget is estimated to climb another 18.5% by
2015, exceeding $150 billion (Fraser, 2012).
Harvard Professor Linda Bilmes (2011, p. 1)
writes,
“The history of previous wars shows that the
cost of caring for war veterans rises for several
decades and peaks in 30 to 40 years or more
after a conflict. This will be especially true for
veterans of the current wars. Veterans from
Iraq and Afghanistan are utilizing VA medical
services and applying for disability benefits
at much higher rates than in previous wars.
Based on current patterns of benefit claims
and medical usage, it is estimated that the
total present value of such costs for Iraq and
Afghanistan veterans over the next 40 years is
in the range of $600 billion to $1 trillion.”
In the face of resource constraints, if veterans’ programs and benefits become vulnerable
to future spending reductions, it is likely that a
National Veterans Strategy would provide a more
judicious and consensus-driven lens through
which to consider possible reductions (as compared to the status quo). Within the framework
of a National Veterans Strategy, proposed
reductions would necessarily be considered in

A National Veterans Strategy: The Economic, Social and Security Imperative

the context of the economic, moral-ethical and
broader national geostrategic implications vis-àvis America’s obligation to its military veterans.
A coherent policy planning framework will serve
as a principled mechanism to rationalize future
spending on veterans’ benefits with broader, often competing, strategic goals. Moreover, since
any future cuts would thus be justified according
to national priorities, the framework will serve to
limit their politicization in future budget debates.
Second, the current institutional framework
governing the scope of challenges affecting
veterans remains far too disparate, reactive, and
administratively marginalized, despite the best,
well-intentioned efforts of myriad actors across
the public and private sectors. To consider the
institutional framework governing the scope of
challenges affecting veterans, we identified and
cataloged more than 1,300 Federal and State
policies, Executive Orders, and agency directives
that impact (directly or indirectly) veterans and/
or their families, within a Policy Landscape Matrix (see Figures 1 & 2). While the current policy
landscape engages almost every federal agency
in some level of policy or programmatic responsibility for veterans issues, in many cases these
policies – based on legislative intent, funding
sources, or other bureaucratic issues – actually
marginalize opportunities for interagency collaboration and efficient resource utilization. Extant
policy is “crowding out” meaningful collaboration by marginalizing the opportunity to allocate
inherently constrained resources to their first,
best use.
For example, the policy landscape analysis
highlights many examples of redundant effort,
overlapping responsibility and underutilized
programming and resources across federal agencies and between federal and state
governments. While it is not our purpose to
deconstruct the universe of these policy-specific examples in this report, we observe that
some include responsibility overlap, duplicative
resource allocation, and poor coordination
between the departments of Labor, Veterans
Affairs and Defense related to veteran employment and training programs (GAO, 2012b). The
VA and Medicare were also found to have made
$13 billion in duplicative payments to providers of veterans health-care services (Trivedi,
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A COMPLEX POLICY LANDSCAPE
To inform this publication, our research team identified and cataloged more than 1,300
Federal and State policies, Executive Orders, and agency directives that impact (directly or
indirectly) veterans and/or their families, within a Policy Landscape Matrix.
The scope of this effort spans the period between 1997 (105th Congress), and
continues through 2011 (112th Congress). Each policy was catalogued based on 11
criteria, to include level of government, name, effective date, reference, source, term,
lead entity, other entity, category, impact area and beneficiary. Additionally, each policy
was categorized by overarching theme (to summarize the policy objective) to include:
Education, Employment, Health, Compensation and Other. While our categorization
methodology focused on identifying – within the universe of all veteran-related polices
– those that specifically impact the major, post-service concerns of veterans (Education,
Employment, Health and Compensation), the overwhelming majority of veteran-focused
policies focused on “Other” themes and objectives. Figure 1 below decomposes the
distribution of policy objectives represented by the landscape of veterans’ policy as based
on our review. To further define the “Other” category, additional analysis was performed to
capture the underlying purpose of these polices, as depicted in Figure 2 below.

Figure 1: Policy ‘Category’ Summary
Education
Employment
Health
Compensation
Other
0

200

400

600

800

Figure 2: ‘Other’ Veterans’ Policies
Legal 11%
Facilities 29%
Legislative Intent 9%
Logistics 4%

Recognition 10%
Oversight 24%
Procurement 1%
Personnel 12%

et al., 2012). Without a unifying framework
that logically informs the goals and objectives
to be realized as a consequence of a public
investment in veterans, it becomes exceedingly
difficult to evaluate the return on the public
investment in veteran-focused programs and
services (Berglass, 2012).
Third, there is considerable public goodwill

Extant policy is ‘crowding
out’ meaningful collaboration by
marginalizing the opportunity to
allocate inherently constrained
resources to their first, best use.”

toward veterans and military families today.
Between July 2001 and August 2012, there was
a 181% increase in the number of registered
veteran support nonprofit organizations filing
a Form 990 with the Internal Revenue Service,
with a corresponding increase of $2.9 trillion
in reported total assets (National Center for
Charitable Statistics).4 It is reasonable and
prudent to assume, however, that the salience
of veteran-focused concerns will decline in
the public consciousness as the nation moves
further from a decade at war. The community
of stakeholders impacted by the concerns of
veterans and their families has a unique – but
fleeting – opportunity to marshal this extant
public support and build consensus around
a common and enduring vision related to the
community reintegration and post-service life
course support available to our veterans. A
comprehensive National Veterans Strategy,
inclusive of non-governmental and private- sector stakeholders, will help to more smartly align
and focus public and private sector resources
toward these goals (Berglass, 2012).
Fourth, data-driven scholarship that informs
veterans’ policy is central to principled policy
formulation, implementation and evaluation –
Legal
especially in the face of an increasingly complex
universe of economic, social, and policy challengLegis
es impacting veterans and military families. This
scholarship, consequently, demands an interdis- Logis
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ciplinary perspective to draw upon and integrate
important intellectual contributions from multiple
academic disciplines and fields of practice. Such
a level of coordinated, interdisciplinary scholarship aimed at accumulating policy-relevant and
actionable knowledge on veterans’ issues does
not presently exist (Carter, 2012, pp. 24-25). If
the process includes robust public engagement, a
National Veterans Strategy should help cultivate,
unite and organize an interdisciplinary field of veteran policy studies that supports more principled
veteran policymaking.
Fifth, the maturation and institutionalization
of the AVF has created a situation where a
shared burden for national defense is an artifact
of the past; as such, increasingly fewer members of our society have any tangible connection
to the military (Pew, 2011a). Naturally, there
will always be some distance between military
and societal norms and values. This distance
is evident in the fact that today, both veterans
and non-veterans agree that the American
public does not fully understand the complex
challenges facing the nation’s veterans and
military families (Pew, 2011b). Managing this
divide requires carefully balancing the inherent tensions between the military’s functional
purpose of maintaining a distinct ethos and set
of values necessary to provide effective security,
while at the same time ensuring this effort
remains sensibly responsive to, and culturally
integrated with, American society (Burk, 2001).
Assuming the all-volunteer policy will endure
given its resilience over the past four decades,
an ongoing public dialogue is absolutely
necessary to continually bridge these evolving
cultural differences (Gronke & Feaver, 2001, p.
161) and to mitigate the perceived alienation
resulting from the larger social forces at work
today (Demers, 2011). Whether the civil-military
gap widens or converges in the years ahead, a
National Veterans Strategy will institutionalize
a three-way dialogue between the public, the
military, and the government, thereby reinforcing
stable civil-military
relations in the long-term through increased
opportunity for public participation (Clausewitz,
2006, pp. 30-31; Huntington, 2006, pp. 78-92).
Finally, national security experts envision the

future force as smaller, more technologically-advanced, capable of working with global partners
and operating in austere and, at times, high-profile circumstances (DOD, 2012). This global
security environment demands a future force
composed of our nation’s most skilled, qualified
and service-minded individuals – those bright,
assertive middle and high school students
carefully attuned to the media and keenly aware

A National Veterans Strategy is
both symbolic and instrumental with
regard to affirming America’s enduring
obligation to those who have served,
and will serve in the future.”
of issues impacting those who volunteer for
military service (Humensky, Jordan, Stroupe, &
Hynes, 2013).5 As a self-selective institution, the
AVF is increasingly comprised of members who
have had former family ties to the military (Pew,
2011a). Importantly, the past decade at war is
the first extended test of the all-volunteer model
since its inception in 1973. Thus, we have yet to
fully understand the implications of the model
as related to the social contract between those
who volunteer and those who do not. We know
from examples of European nations — such as
the Netherlands, France, Sweden, and especially the United Kingdom (nations which have
maintained a long tradition of all-volunteer service) — that post-service policies and practices
impacting military veterans have a direct impact
on future recruiting and retention (Dandeker,
Wessely, Iversen, & Ross, 2006). Importantly,
we know from those examples that over time, an
all-volunteer service model cultivates distance
and erodes the social contract between those
who serve and those who benefit from the military service of others (Dandeker, et al., 2006).
Many would suggest the beginnings of a similar
trend in the U.S.; a recent Pew Research Center
poll indicates that only 48% of Americans would
recommend military service to a young person.
Further, while 83% of those surveyed acknowledge that military members and their families
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have had to make significant sacrifices since
9/11, seven in ten of those who acknowledged
this burden attributed this sacrifice to simply
“part of being in the military” (Pew, 2011b, p.
60). Moreover, only 12% of Americans feel the
public understands the benefits and rewards of
military service well or fairly well (2011b, p. 64).
In the end, a National Veterans Strategy is central to affirming America’s enduring obligation
to those who have served and will serve in the
future.
For these reasons, we suggest a National
Veterans Strategy facilitates the opportunity
to re-craft the existing institutional framework
that governs and executes veterans’ policy, in
a way that promotes sound, economical public
governance; stable civil-military relations; and a
strong, sustainable national defense. It is abundantly clear that action now toward crafting
and implementing a National Veterans Strategy
would confer great benefit not only to veterans
and their families but to all Americans.
A National Veterans Strategy is necessary to
serve three central purposes: 1) to harness
and sustain citizen and government-wide
investment in the concerns affecting veterans
and military families; 2) promote 21st century
public governance of veterans’ issues; and 3)
contribute to a stronger, sustainable national
defense. Importantly, each of these purposes is
grounded in a set of closely-held assumptions
and attitudes about American citizenship,
fairness, military service and civil-military
relations. Accordingly, to articulate a fullydeveloped logic supporting a National Veterans
Strategy – logic intended as a foundation for
policy advancement and administrative action
– it is important to consider and deconstruct
the foundational assumptions embedded
within the broader intent of a National Veterans
Strategy. The assumptions identified below
reflect a number of significant normative
choices to be made within a strategic planning
process. They are not intended to represent the
full set of possible assumptions.
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A NATIONAL STRATEGY:

THE FOUNDATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS
CITIZEN AND GOVERNMENT-WIDE
INVESTMENT IN VETERANS AFFAIRS

“Only when we coordinate and
collaborate across the public
and private sector, can we
hope to provide a continuum
of support for our veterans,
especially for our wounded.
We have to start thinking in
terms of a 50-year, nationwide,
coordinated plan. Until we have
a National Veterans Strategy
to help coordinate all efforts,
we will be giving our veterans
less than they’ve earned on the
field of battle.”
— Jim Knotts
Chief Executive Officer
Operation Homefront

The supports and benefits afforded to veterans
in return for their service are a direct reflection of
the extent to which military service is valued by
society. This support reveals norms of citizenship
and justice in the context of additional rights
and privileges granted to military veterans.
Determining a fair and reasonable level of
post-service supports demands both national
leadership and broad civic engagement. A
National Veterans Strategy establishes a
deliberative, democratic process that fosters
national dialogue and builds broad citizen and
government-wide engagement in veterans’ policy.
As a consequence, it holds the added potential
of helping to repair a pervasive citizenship deficit
across the nation (Nabatchi, 2010). Importantly,
this premise assumes:

ASSUMPTION #1
The social contract between American society and
its veterans is inviolate, enduring and must be
continuously upheld.
AND

ASSUMPTION #2

The social contract between American society and its
veterans, by extension, confers a societal obligation
to support the families of those who serve.
The notion that cultivating civic and
governmental engagement in veterans’ issues is
important assumes an enduring moral obligation
to veterans. In other words, President Lincoln’s
pledge “to care for him who shall have borne the
battle and for his widow and his orphan” is an
eternal promise that holds for present and future
generations.
Indeed, America’s legacy of caring for its
veterans dates back to the late 17th century
at Plymouth Colony, which provided pensions
to veterans disabled while protecting the
colony (VA, n.d., p. 3). Immediately following
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the American Revolution, the general public
sentiment reflected an ideological distrust
of a standing army and the belief that the
American Revolution was a people’s war
shouldered by the whole of society (Resch,
1999, p. 2). However, it was the 1818 Pension
Act that institutionalized the persistent and
transformative image of the suffering soldier
as a symbol of American patriotism and
citizenship and subsequently legitimized
the Continental Army (1999, pp. 4-5). This
enactment of law and creation of a new
pension regime as a gesture of national
gratitude cemented “the nation’s celebratory
rites of self-affirmation and renewal” and
“established a new way to bind [future]
generations” (p. 201).
Beyond American heritage and tradition, the
very act of maintaining a force of volunteers to
preserve the existing democratic order (e.g.,
“to defend the Constitution against foreign
enemies and domestic”) carries with it certain
moral obligations. At least four obligations are
germane to the claim that America’s social
contract is inviolate and enduring.
First, because our military acts on behalf of
a democratic society to apply force, the applied
force must necessarily be limited to minimize
human rights violations and remain consistent
with society’s democratic values (Burk, 2005).
This assumption implies a direct connection
and moral obligation between a society and
its military personnel, specifically that military
personnel are sufficiently imbued with and
committed to acting within these values.
Second, and by extension, the respect and
dignity of our soldiers and veterans must be
maintained since they are our agents, citizens,
and “ends in themselves” (Burk, 2005, p. 162)
who we subject to moral risks in the management of violence and repeated “choice[s]
between lesser evils” (Burk, p. 159; Brock and
Lettini, 2010).
Third, the AVF model necessarily means
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that military family members are both serving
and sacrificing, as an inherent consequence of
a family member’s decision to serve in uniform.
We often talk of the sacrifices made by military
families as being altruistic and benevolent,
whereas in reality these sacrifices are a necessary condition of sustaining the efficacy of the
AVF.
Finally, the enduring, intergenerational nature of America’s social contract with its veterans and military families is rooted in a natural,
civic duty to create and uphold just institutions
toward the improvement of civilization (Rawls,
1971, p. 293). Additionally, generations must
not only maintain these institutions but also
“put aside in each period of time a suitable
amount of real capital accumulation” according to a “just savings principle” appropriate to
the present state of society (pp. 285, 287).
Creating a National Veterans Strategy is thus a
morally justified act that supports our nation’s
capacity to maintain our promise to current
and future generations of veterans and military
families.
It is important to note that while history and
convention assume a social contract between
the nation and its veterans, the nature of that
contract (regarding rights, benefits, and honoraria) has evolved – and presumably will continue to evolve – over time as a function of social,
economic and political norms and constraints.
Consequently, though we assume the social
contract between American society and its veterans is inviolate, enduring and something to
be upheld, we make no assumption with regard
to the nature or degree of the rights, benefits,
or honoraria conferred to veterans as a means
to honor this contract.

ASSUMPTION #3
While veterans are honored in American society
today, this social distinction is neither a historical
constant, nor is it assured for future generations.
Regardless of attitudes about the recent wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq, public sentiment for
and pride in the military and its veterans is at
an all-time high (Pew, 2011b, p. 60). The American public has demonstrated an outpouring of
support and generosity for veterans. In addition

to the recent expansion of veterans’ benefits
by Congress, supporting veterans and military
families, particularly their successful transition

We often talk of the sacrifices
made by military families as being
altruistic and benevolent, whereas
in reality these sacrifices are a
necessary condition of sustaining
the efficacy of the AVF.”
to the civilian workforce, remains a top priority
of the Obama administration and the Joining
Forces initiative. The VA is undergoing a transformation to better serve the needs of a more
diverse veteran population including a greater
focus on female veterans. A new ecosystem of
nonprofit organizations working to address the
concerns of veterans and their families, and an
expanding veterans’ policy and research community, has emerged over the past decade.
Veterans clearly enjoy a special status in
American society today, unlike Vietnam War veterans who preceded them. But as previous experience shows, this confidence may be superficial
and may not last indefinitely (Gronke & Feaver,
2001). Accordingly, the current “sea of goodwill”
(Berglass, 2012; Copeland & Sutherland, 2010;
Mullen, 2008) gives ample prospect to institutionalize a policymaking process that ensures
constructive debate and civil-military dialogue on
veterans’ issues whether or not rougher waters
lie ahead.
To some degree, establishing a national
strategy will proactively seize an opportunity to
prevent future injustices like those experienced
by our Vietnam generation. Its establishment is a
moral argument for protecting future volunteers
from evolving popular opinion and politics over
the role and use of the armed forces abroad.
Should declining public opinion and legitimacy
in the armed forces ever reach a point of crisis,
a National Veterans Strategy will help to better
disentangle and constructively channel often
intertwined debates over military and veterans’
policy.
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21ST CENTURY PUBLIC
GOVERNANCE OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS
Caring for veterans and military families has
evolved into a complex public service. To
sustain and continuously improve the efficient
and effective delivery of these services
demands a “whole-of-government” vision that
transcends any individual agency and which
engages civil society.

ASSUMPTION #4
The existing institutional arrangement governing
veterans’ policy is not adequately informed or
coordinated by a coherent “whole-of-government”
policy or optimally integrated with private-sector
efforts.
Both the scope of veterans’ policy and the
number of governmental, public and private actors operating in this space is expansive. Veterans’ policy covers issues of urgent and critical
concern, including (but not limited to) veteran
suicide, education, post-traumatic stress (PTS),
homelessness and unemployment (Carter,
2012). It includes other medium- and longterm areas related to benefits, disability claims
(including both VA and SSA) and access to
healthcare (2012). Likewise, the institutional
arrangement of veteran-related regulations
and programs is multi-level and multi-sector,
involving numerous federal agencies, state and
local governments, and private and nonprofit
stakeholders in civil society.
In complex fields such as veterans’ policy,
major institutional reforms would likely be slow,
inefficient, or worse, counterproductive to the
overall intent of caring for veterans and military
families during a critical postwar transition period. Despite redundancies highlighted above,
centralization of some programs or services
may be suboptimal since certain agencies have
niche strengths and comparative advantages
over others. For example, in comparison to the
rest of the federal government, the departments of Labor and Commerce have the greatest institutional capacity for addressing broad
unemployment. Yet, tackling unemployment of
a more targeted population, such as veterans,
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requires robust coordination with the VA, DoD,
the Chamber of Commerce, state governments,
the private sector and other stakeholders.
Successful interagency coordination and
cooperation is typically governed by:
“a detailed, clearly defined strategy; a
commitment to shared objectives and clear
targets informed by an overarching strategic
vision; a transparency of operations; and
strategic interests being given priority over
local or sectional interests” (McQuaid, 2010,
p. 139).
Strategic planning, which generally outlines
how resources (means) will be used (ways) to
achieve stated goals (ends), is especially critical
in complex policy areas requiring collaborative
governance arrangements and broad multi-sector participation. Yet, no comprehensive interagency planning process presently exists that
adequately governs the veterans’ policy space
– one that clearly defines a national strategic
vision for veterans’ policy; identifies short-,
medium-, and long-term planning goals across
the federal government; and establishes formal
coordination mechanisms to drive effective
policy coordination and execution.
The current role of the VA is to act as a service-delivery and implementing agency – not
a driver of federal policy or national strategy.
While the VA maintains a forward-looking
strategic plan outlining its departmental vision,
transformational goals, and planned initiatives
through the year 2015, many of its major initiatives are simply unattainable without robust
integration with other governmental, non-governmental, and community-based partners.
Likewise, while it retains ultimate responsibility
for veterans’ policy, the VA has no authority (nor
does any other federal agency) to establish
or oversee mechanisms necessary to drive
cross-governmental and public-private coordination on veterans’ services and programs.

ASSUMPTION #5
Changes to the rights, benefits, and services that
represent societal means of satisfying the social
contract between the nation and those who serve
should be principled, rational and coordinated.
Rising federal debt and statutory entitlement
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program costs (social security, healthcare) are
placing substantial pressure on discretionary
programs – including veterans’ affairs. Despite
an inviolate and enduring obligation to veterans
and military families (Assumption #1), the reality of finite resources and the nation’s long-term
fiscal health demand certain limitations and
prioritizations. If future reductions in funding for
veterans benefits or service are ever considered, making these tough choices within the
framework of a National Veterans Strategy will
give them justified and rationalized importance,
rather than leaving them to unproductive partisan debate or ad hoc, incremental outcomes.
Additionally, if the quality and level of veterans benefits are to be maximized
despite leaner budgets, federal, state, and local
governments and private and nonprofit sector
partners must continue to gain efficiencies
through coordination and collaboration driven
by a common strategic vision. Improved veteran
transition to civilian life will help mitigate rising
healthcare and benefit costs, not only across
the federal government, but also at the state
level for unemployment, Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF), civilian healthcare,
and other related costs (i.e., criminal system
involvement, substance abuse, domestic
violence, or others).

A SUSTAINABLE NATIONAL
DEFENSE
National security is paramount for survival
and thus societies must be able to raise and
maintain defense forces as necessary. The way
a nation recruits its armed forces significantly
impacts the relationship between its military
and society because it connects the individual
citizen to the nation’s defense (Micewski, 2006,
p. 209).
Over the last 40 years, there has been
much debate over the benefits and drawbacks
of conscript- and volunteer-based recruiting
models, especially their respective compatibility
with democratic values and civic participation
(Abrams & Bacevich, 2001; Cohen, 2001). This
debate continues even today (Cancian, 2011;
Gilroy, 2010; Yingling, 2010). Though there were

occasional challenges, the AVF has been tested
and proven largely successful (Bailey, 2009;
CBO, 2007; Oi, 2003; Rostker, 2006; Warner &
Asch, 2001). Since 1973, the AVF has not threatened our democracy nor has it created a military
social caste (Micewski, 2006, p. 213), despite
well-documented civil-military cultural and
attitudinal differences (e.g., “the gap”) (Feaver
& Kohn, 2001). However, the AVF remains
highly dependent upon a continuous supply of
highly-skilled and educated recruits imbued with
democratic ideals. This recruiting pool is highly
sensitive to economic inducements (including
veterans’ benefits) and economic trends (Simon
& Warner, 2007). Thus, our premise that a National Veterans Strategy is positioned to cultivate
and nurture a sustainable national defense is
based on:

ASSUMPTION #6
A positive social perception of military service
positively serves the AVF imperative of recruiting a
high-quality and socio-economically representative
force.
AND

ASSUMPTION #7
Efforts to support the post-service welfare of those
who volunteer for service positively serves the AVF
imperative of recruiting a high-quality and socioeconomically representative force.
The late Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf was
straightforward about the AVF: “[P]eople don’t
join the military to do poorly…they say, ‘I think
I’ll enlist in the Army because I want to do
better’” (Schwarzkopf, 1991). America’s sons
and daughters who voluntarily choose military
service are motivated by positive beliefs – a
“sense of self-esteem and moral value” (Janowitz, 1971, p. 440) – in military service, economic incentives or a combination of the two.
Fundamental values of honor, patriotism, family
tradition and civic obligation motivate military
service. Gainful employment, advanced training
and education, and general upward economic
mobility do so as well. Just as important, the
successes of the military itself, alongside visible
examples of successful veterans, shape public
attitudes that, in turn, strengthen positive
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beliefs in and decisions about military service.
In the absence of the draft, neither core
beliefs, nor incentives, nor public favor in military
service are alone sufficient to sustain the AVF.
Rather, these influences are jointly reinforcing.
Effective citizenship and military integration
with society is difficult for any modern democracy, and it must be nurtured (Janowitz, 1983).
Postmodern ideals in Western Europe serve as a
caution to the U.S. with respect to the AVF. There,
“individualism has taken a toll on citizenship,
and while there is no shortage of volunteer associations assuming a variety of socially useful
roles, few volunteers relish the thought of serving as part of a bureaucratic state organization,”
including the military (Boene, 2003, p. 175).
Fortunately for now, the sense of duty still
outpolls other reasons for choosing to serve,
despite arguments suggesting that today’s
service members primarily hold economic
motivations (Krebs, 2009, p. 165). However,
Morris Janowitz’s claim still holds that, “in the
long run, it is doubtful whether the military
establishment, like other public agencies,
could maintain its organizational effectiveness
merely by raising monetary rewards…[since]
the incentive system would not necessarily
produce the required perspectives and
professional commitments” (1971, p. 422).
If not continuously nurtured by a society
that values military service as a respected
profession and expression of citizenship, the
military will increasingly attract volunteers
motivated purely for economic gain from
increasingly narrower socio-economic
segments of our society. The ultimate danger
here (the primary fear and criticism of the AVF)
is that an unrepresentative military evolves into
a political pressure group, creating a crisis in
American civil-military relations and threatening
the liberal democratic order. Policies that
harness public support for transitioning
veterans (without victimizing them) reinforce
positive societal beliefs about military service.
A positive societal view of military service is
thus important to encourage broader socioeconomic representation in the AVF.
Most importantly, the benefits and supports
that veterans receive tie directly to all three

support systems described above. First, they
provide additional economic incentives to
serve. Second, they symbolically honor veterans and military families for their sacrifices,
thus reinforcing individual values of patriotism
and civic duty. Third, they reinforce and sustain
positive societal values toward military service
through reaffirming their obligations. A National
Veterans Strategy will add significant value
along each of these lines, thereby enhancing
the overall recruiting and retention climate for
the AVF and enabling a sustainable and strong
national defense.
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BUILDING CONSENSUS AND PROCESS:
GUIDING QUESTIONS

P

erhaps the most pressing challenge in
American public administration today is
managing the inherent tension between
providing efficient, responsive governance
and retaining the strategic agility (grand-strategic and inter-departmental) to rapidly adapt
in an increasingly dynamic, uncertain world.
Building and sustaining consensus around a
common vision – both within agencies and
across the federal government – is absolutely essential in successful strategy-making
(Trubowitz, Goldman, & Rhodes, 1999). Yet,
in our federal system, power is purposely
divided, values and interests are many and
institutional change is incremental, which
only complicates this task.
The preceding section identified seven
major assumptions that ground the
central arguments supporting a National
Veterans Strategy. It is our contention that
these assumptions inform the conceptual
foundations of a “whole-of-government”
effort, executed in partnership with the
private sector and other stakeholders
to veterans’ affairs, to articulate and
institutionalize a National Veterans Strategy.
In what follows, we offer a series of guiding
questions that suggest a deliberative process
to either challenge or affirm the foundational
assumptions identified above. Specifically,
these questions are offered as a means to:
1) Constructively frame a debate on
veterans’ issues toward the development
of reasoned, popularly supported policy
goals; and

2) Serve as an initial framework from which
to craft an increasingly robust model
of engagement related to the strategic
planning process — rules, incentives,
oversight mechanisms and coordination
of resources aimed at efficient and
effective policy implementation.
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Building and sustaining consensus around a common vision—both
within agencies and across the federal government—is absolutely
essential in successful strategy-making.”
Who should be involved in a strategic conversation and planning process
impacting veterans’ policy?
Federal government stakeholders?
State and local government stakeholders?
Non-profit, academic, and private sector stakeholders?
The general public?

Why do we, as Americans, care for our veterans?
How have our history and traditions influenced these values?
What are the moral/ethical considerations?
What are the economic considerations?
What are the security implications?

Who is an American veteran?
Should the term be all-inclusive or exclusive?
Who deserves support within this definition? Are family members included in this
definition? If not, why? If so, which family members and to what extent?
Is this definition immutable over time (total war vs. limited war vs. peacetime)?
How does the type of military force (all-volunteer vs. citizen-soldier vs. mixed)
influence our definition of a veteran?
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What recognition, entitlements and other services ought the
nation provide its veterans and military families?
What is (are) the primary goal(s) of veteran transition?
How do these goals support democratic values and
Constitutional rights?How do these goals support the National
Security Strategy and related strategic planning documents?
Is the intent of veteran transition restorative or progressive?
Why?
What are fair and just rewards (symbolic and material) for
military service?What breadth/scope of benefits and services is
necessary to achieve these goals?
What can the nation reasonably afford to provide its veterans?
What can the nation afford? What are the limits on veterans’
benefits?
At what point does increasing benefits create an entitlement
culture in the military and negatively impact the quality and
character of the AVF?
In a constrained fiscal climate, what is the priority of benefits and
services? What are the eligibility criteria for benefits and services?
Time in/character of service? Combat/non-combat service?
Injuries suffered? Financial need?
How (and by who) should these benefits and services be
delivered?
The Tools of Government: Direct government? Governmentsponsored enterries? Public-private networks? Private sector/
contracts? Grants/Loans/ Vouchers? Combinations?
How will the VA’s internal strategic plan fit within and support a
broader National Veterans Strategy?
Which benefits and services fall outside the VA’s purview? To
what extent and why?What are the current administrative
authorities and division of labor?
What integration and/or performance deficiencies need
addressing?
What are the trade-offs and transaction costs of reform (i.e.,
administrative and program consolidation vs. new institutions to
force/promote coordination)?Is there a need for specific ‘microstrategies’ on cross-cutting issues (i.e., post-traumatic stress,
suicides, homelessness)?
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“This report is an important
contribution to the growing
canon of literature in support
of a National Veterans Strategy
and should help advance the
national conversation toward
actionable plans for policy
change.”
— Nancy Berglass
Director, the Iraq Afghanistan
Deployment Impact Fund
Senior Fellow, Center for a
New American Security

“We need bold and thoughtful
strategies this year to address
the challenges facing veterans
and military families because
the public’s attention will soon
turn away from us. I applaud
the concept of a National
Veterans Strategy and encourage policymakers to give these
recommendations serious
attention.”
— Kathy Roth-Douquet
Chief Executive Officer
Blue Star Families
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SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS

T
“Fewer and fewer Americans
serve in the military and
sacrifice in the nation’s wars.
This proposal recommends a
thoughtful and imaginative
process to begin to
institutionalize and secure
our responsibility to them and
their families and to meet
this national obligation more
efficiently, more effectively,
and more transparently. Doing
this should be a matter of high
national priority.”
— James Wright
President Emeritus &
Eleazar Wheelock Professor of History
Dartmouth College

his paper provides the conceptual
foundation and justification for a National
Veterans Strategy. We maintain that
the second Obama administration – in close
partnership with Congress, state and local
governments, veteran support organizations, and
the private sector – is well-positioned to act on
the opportunity detailed in this publication and
by doing so confer to veterans, their families and
to all Americans important social, economic and
security advantages.
Policymaking impacting veterans and their
families need not – and certainly ought not – be
adversarial. Undoubtedly, the veterans’ policy
space is incredibly broad and complex. It is unreasonable to expect that one single federal agency,
with sufficient organization and resources, is the
panacea to the challenges facing transitioning
veterans and military families. Veterans’ policy
is a societal obligation. Accordingly, instead of
being viewed as “institutional turf” to defend,
annex, or avoid altogether, veterans’ policy should
be viewed as a shared responsibility and be
governed collaboratively to the greatest extent
possible.
Surely, all the hard work in translating concepts and policies to effective practice and good
governance lies ahead. Successful collaborative
governance is not only difficult to create but even
more challenging to sustain given the multi-level
leadership necessary to align structures, processes, and accountabilities over time (Bryson, Crosby
& Stone, 2006). But given the overwhelming
public support for veterans and military families,
combined with progress and momentum gained
from recent policy developments, now is the time
to act.
We conclude by offering six initial recommendations to the Obama administration and Congress to consider in initiating a National Veterans
Strategy.

RECOMMENDATION
Create a presidentially-directed Veterans’ Public
Engagement and Collaborative Governance
Commission, responsible for engaging a broad base
of stakeholders in a dialogue on veterans’ issues.
The president should direct the establishment of
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a Veterans’ Public Engagement and Collaborative
Governance Commission, compliant with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (1972), to: 1) solicit
public and private sector input and participation
in the development of national veterans’ policy;
and 2) to make recommendations on a national
and “whole-of-government” approach to align
government, public, and private sector veteran
programs and initiatives under a common set of
goals and principles.
Veterans policy demands a collaborative governance approach – an “arrangement where one
or more public agencies directly engage [private]
stakeholders in a collective decision-making
process that is formal, consensus-oriented and
deliberative, and that aims to make or implement
public policy or manage public programs or assets” (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 544). Membership
of this commission would thus be intentionally
broad and inclusive. Still, it is imperative that this
body report directly to the president, similar to the
President’s Intelligence Advisory Board, to ensure
the necessary reach and authority to motivate
action and to sustain executive ownership of the
process.
This body should first solicit stakeholder
input through a structured nationwide dialogue.
This dialogue could be accomplished through a
series of meetings across the country, leading
up to a national conference or summit. Toward
this end, the Commission might also consider
collaborating with the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and soliciting recommendations
and lessons learned in public engagement with
state and local government and private sector
stakeholders. In fact, DHS recently implemented
a similar model described above to encourage
state, local and private sector participation in a
national dialogue on homeland security policy
(DHS, 2012b, pp. D-1, D-2). Moreover, many important lessons from successful community-level
collaboration between VA facilities, federal, state
and local veterans’ programs, and the public and
private sector organizations will be invaluable to
collect and draw upon throughout this process.

RECOMMENDATION
Establish a single point of authority (directive
and budgetary), responsible for coordinating and
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directing the execution of a National Veterans
Strategy.
The president should appoint and delegate the
necessary authority to a single federal entity to
lead and oversee the execution of an interagency
strategy that clearly defines a national vision
for veterans’ policy; identifies short-, medium-,
and long-term planning goals across the federal
government; establishes formal coordination
mechanisms to drive effective policy coordination and execution; and promotes transparency,
accountability and maximum public and private
sector participation. This single authority would
also assume responsibility to purposefully align
the National Veterans Strategy within the broader
National Security Strategy planning framework.
Importantly, the Congressional oversight structure
for this authority should be considered carefully.
Subjecting this point of authority to a multitude of
oversight committees may be overly burdensome
or self-defeating toward the end of improving
effective and efficiency interagency coordination.

RECOMMENDATION
Establish an Interagency Policy Committee on
Veterans, responsible for crafting a National Veterans
Strategy.
In parallel with the Veterans’ Public Engagement
and Collaborative Governance Commission, the
president should create an interagency policy
committee on veterans responsible for developing
an enduring and comprehensive National Veterans Strategy. This committee would coordinate
directly with the Domestic Policy Council and
National Security Staff and fall within the existing
framework for interagency planning and presidential action.6 At the outset, this body should assess
the critical preconditions to successful collaborative governance (e.g., history of institutional
conflict and cooperation, participation incentives,
power and resource imbalances, leadership, institutional design) and the feasibility of designing
and integrating into the process itself tailored
approaches to increase direct dialogue, trust,
and the development of commitment and shared
understanding across government and the private
sector (Ansell & Gash, 2008).
Drawing upon the findings and recommendations from the Public Engagement Commission,
this committee should specifically focus on: areas
of inefficient service delivery and performance;
gaps in and barriers to interagency coordination

and information sharing (both institutional and
regulatory); opportunities for governance innovation, particularly in leveraging technology and
other Web 2.0 tools to increase both interagency
and public-private coordination; and recommended reform initiatives to incorporate within
the National Veterans Strategy implementation
process.

RECOMMENDATION
Establish a standing National Veterans Advisory
Board, responsible for providing strategic advice and
counsel to the president, Congress and implementing
agencies related to veteran’s policy.
As previously recommended (Berglass, 2010;
Carter, 2012), the president should formally
establish a National Veterans Advisory Board.
Ideally, this board would be born out of the initial
public engagement commission, report to the
president, and be comprised of key leaders and
experts from partnering federal agencies, state
and local government, veteran support nonprofit
organizations, the private sector, and academia.
This body will provide long-term objective
advice and recommendations to the president,
Congress, VA Secretary, and partner agencies on
matters of strategic importance to veterans’ policy. Its initial charge would be to support the VA
Secretary and Interagency Policy Committee on
Veterans in developing courses of action to implement a strategic interagency planning process for
veterans’ affairs policy. It would assume a longterm public engagement and governance role
taken on by the initial commission while helping
to lead and strengthen an emerging policy and
research community on veterans’ issues (Carter,
2012, pp. 24-25). Finally, this board would also
collaborate with the Veterans Health Administration’s Office of Research and Development.

RECOMMENDATION
Create and institutionalize a forward-looking, periodic
review process designed to assess evolving veterans’
policy and programs across the federal government.
Finally, Congress should mandate the establishment of a forward-looking, periodic review
process to continuously assess veterans’ policy
and programs across the federal government.
This review process serves the purpose of evaluating veteran and military family needs, long-term
veterans’ policy goals, interagency coordination
and alignment, capabilities and resources, and of
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ensuring government transparency and propriety.
While this process would closely mirror and
complement the Quadrennial Defense Review, it
should be independently led by the sole authority
appointed to direct the execution of the National
Veterans Strategy, per prior recommendation.

RECOMMENDATION
Congress should create a voluntary coalition
of veteran-serving organizations, philanthropic
associations, and other private sector stakeholders,
responsible for cultivating and formalizing a model
of collaborative engagement (public-private,
private-private and national-state-community) that
best aligns the resources of government, corporate,
foundation and community partners in support of
veterans and their families.
Veterans and military families are faced
with a large and increasing number of entities
serving their needs. This complex web of
supportive services and resources creates both
a distinct challenge for veterans and family
members to navigate and a broader problem
of effectively and efficiently matching services
to the needs of the population. Further, legal
barriers currently obstruct opportunities for
meaningful collaboration between the public and
private sector, inhibiting the optimal utilization
of corporate, foundation, and community-based
resources alongside government provided
support for veterans and military families.
Accordingly, Congress should create
a voluntary coalition of veteran-serving
organizations, philanthropic associations and
other private sector stakeholders, responsible
for cultivating and formalizing a model of
collaborative engagement (public-private,
private-private, and national-state-community)
that best aligns their collective efforts and
resources. This coalition could be created as a
“government corporation” and be charged with
providing a means of internal and cross-sector
communication and coordination.
Additionally, this coalition would identify best
practices and guiding principles for collaborative
engagement related to programs and services
for veteran and military families. Improved
public-private engagement will strengthen
relationships across all sectors, allowing all
stakeholders to use their valuable resources to
greater effect and further support the intended
purpose of a the National Veterans Strategy.

17

CONCLUSION

A
“To demonstrate that we
honor and respect our military
veterans, our nation should
engage the brightest minds in
the public and private sectors
to work together to establish
a national veterans strategy.
The time to do this is now.”

n extensive and ongoing review of both public and private sector policy and programing motivated
our purpose: to suggest a researched and logically-developed case for action toward a coordinated
and consensus-driven National Veterans Strategy.
In this report, we have detailed a logic supporting such action, grounded in both this nation’s social
and cultural traditions and situated in the practical realities characteristic of the contemporary economic
and security environment.
The central finding of this report is that coordinated “whole-of-government” action focused toward
crafting and institutionalizing a National Veterans Strategy is necessary to serve important economic,
social and security objectives for the nation in a way that is consistent with the inherent social contract
that defines the relationship between America and its veterans.

— Steve Robinson
U.S. Army Veteran
Leading Veterans Advocate
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